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FOREWORD
Felix B. Chang †

The University of Cincinnati College of Law devoted its
28thAnnual Corporate Law Center Symposium to compliance.1 It
was a timely choice, coinciding not only with an explosion of sector
regulation in recent years but also with shifting market realities for
legal employment and legal education. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)2 and the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act3 are two prominent
examples of major legislation that has added—and will continue to
add—to compliance obligations for broad swathes of industries.
Meanwhile, the financial crisis has spurred profound transformations
in legal employment, including cutbacks in entry level hiring by large
law firms and a concomitant surge of “JD plus” jobs in corporate
compliance.4 In response, law schools have pirouetted (sometimes
ungracefully) to establish compliance courses that position their
graduates to compete for such jobs.
In the face of these changes, however, there is the potential to
remake both compliance programs and compliance education. Even
as new regulations are written, companies can re-conceptualize
compliance in more holistic and paradigm-bending ways—rather
than hiring lobbyists to wage war with regulators. By engaging with
a broader set of stakeholders than traditional corporate
constituencies, for example, compliance programs can better follow
the law—and perhaps even anticipate the risks that regulations intend
to address.5 Further, by espousing ethical values in day-to-day
operations, firms can bolster both their reputations.6 This starts not
just at the board room, of course, but also in the academic training of
† Assistant Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. For the full agenda, see The 28th Annual Corporate Law Center Symposium: Rethinking
Compliance, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI COLLEGE OF LAW (Mar. 13, 2015),
http://law.uc.edu/corporate-law-center/2015-symposium.
2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
3. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 110 Stat. 2033 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)
4. See D. Daniel Sokol, Teaching Compliance, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. __ (2016); William D.
Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 3 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (2013).
5. See Kristin N. Johnson, The Limits of Compliance: Cyber Risk Regulation, 84 U. CIN. L.
REV. __, __ (2016) (adapting New Governance ideas on broadening participation in the regulatory
process); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 373 (2004).
6. Déborah Philippe & Rodolphe Durand, The impact of norm-conforming behaviors on firm
reputation, 32 STRAT. MGMT. J. 969 (2011).
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the next generation of compliance officers even before they enter the
workforce.
The stakes are high for getting compliance right. We are still
reeling from the financial crisis, which, incidentally, was not that
distant from the last round of corporate scandals in the early 2000s.
Those scandals inspired Congress to pass Sarbanes-Oxley (by wide,
bipartisan margins)7, business schools to step up ethics courses, and
the market to embrace internal compliance programs and external
compliance consultancies.8 Yet, arguably, the financial crisis proves
that those efforts failed. As the leaner post-crisis legal departments
and law firms give way to cadres of compliance officers, compliance
itself may become the front line of defense against future economic
meltdowns.
The contributions to this issue of the Cincinnati Law Review
reflect an exuberant spirit that embraces, rather than shirks from, the
challenges of these times. Collectively, the contributions rethink the
implementation and teaching of compliance and advance specific
recommendations on how to improve both.
In Teaching Compliance, Professor Sokol, an expert in antitrust,
offers practical tips for the design and implementation of compliance
education programs. Conscious of the business, legal, and cultural
transformations that have propelled compliance to prominence, his
Essay stresses both the need to actively monitor for risk and the need
to understand, among other things, a firm’s organizational design.9
This speaks to a conundrum that is at the heart of compliance:
specifically, how can a firm give its compliance officers the freedom
and creativity to anticipate problems even though the compliance
function is subsumed within the firm’s larger business operations?
Vis-à-vis the teaching of compliance, Professor Sokol has several
recommendations. Here I will focus on two. First, he argues for
supplementing—or perhaps altogether supplanting—the law school
casebook with business school case studies.10 This fosters out-of-the(legal)-box thinking and helps students understand the world-views
of the businesspeople driving a firm’s decisions. Second, and more
helpful still, Professor Sokol provides a blueprint for the compliance
class, drawn from his own experiences teaching the subject.
7. H.R.
3763
(107th):
Sarbanes-Oxley
Act
of
2002,
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/hr3763.
8. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. LAW Q. 487 (2003). Even by the time of Professor Krawiec’s influential article,
compliance had come a long way since Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d 125
(Del. 1963).
9. See Sokol, supra note __, at __.
10. Id. at __.
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Components include the incentives and organizational design of
firms, risk analysis, and risk mitigation.11 If done right, the law
school compliance class can help future compliance officers
encourage their firms to take on pro-compliance ethical values. Even
before its appearance in print, this Essay was garnering attention in
the legal academy for its insights on compliance courses.12
If the essence of compliance is anticipation, then an area fruitful
for the exploration of compliance is data security, where the threats
are ever changing and the regulatory regimes are frequently weak,
disparate, and contradictory. Today’s businesses face the constant
and ever evolving threat of cyber attacks;13 additionally, the
regulatory frameworks that have developed to protect the storage and
transmission of personal and confidential data can vary widely by
jurisdiction.14 Coincidentally, two essays in this issue consider the
challenges of cybersecurity and data protection in our age.
In Complying with International Data Protection Law, Professor
Cunningham compares the data protection laws in two major
jurisdictions: the U.S. and European Union (“EU”). While the U.S.
approach is fragmented, based on sector regulation of industries that
have traditionally handled private data,15 the EU framework is much
more comprehensive, tied together by a directive that protects the
processing and movement of personal data (the “Data Protection
Directive”).16 The Data Protection Directive is rooted in the notion
that privacy is an expressly fundamental right.17 Significantly, both
the Data Protection Directive and EU Data Protection Regulation,
which is scheduled to replace the directive in 2016, exert
extraterritorial effects on firms domiciled outside the EU. This
framework prohibits the transmission of personal data of EU citizens
to any country or entity that fails to comply with the Directive; only
11 countries have been deemed adequate under the Directive, and the
U.S. is not among them.18 Yet the EU is becoming less of an outlier
11. Id. at ___.
12. See Stephen Bainbridge, Sokol on “Teaching Compliance”, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(June 10, 2015), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/06/sokol-onteaching-compliance.html.
13. Cyber attacks involve theft and abuse of confidential data, fraud, and other misuse. Johnson,
supra note __, at __.
14. See McKay Cunningham, Complying with International Data Protection Law, 84 U. CIN. L.
REV. __ (2016).
15. Id. at __.
16. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter, Data Protection
Directive].
17. See id. at art. 5.
18. Cunningham, supra note __, at __. As an illustration, the Essay notes that a U.S. company
might do business with a party that falls under the EU data protection laws, and, “therefore[,] cannot
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in the stringency with which it protects personal data. Other countries
have adopted laws patterned after the Data Protection Directive, so
the EU has effectively lifted the standards for privacy protection
around the world.19 Here the EU’s first-mover status resembles first
movers of regulation in other areas of the law,20 but because of the
rapid pace of innovation for the technologies which transmit personal
information, resistance has dissipated quickly, and other countries are
coming into conformity.
The lesson from the Data Protection Directive21 nicely
complements Professor Johnson’s essay, The Limits of Compliance:
Cyber Risk Regulation. This Essay surveys the threats from cyber
attacks and concludes that conventional methods—which rely on
common law, state statutes, market solutions, and federal
regulation—cannot keep pace with cyber risks.22 The threats are
simply too protean and often emanate from firm-insiders.23 To
bolster compliance efforts, this Essay looks to the New Governance
literature, which, among other things, (i) encourages broader
participation by bringing diverse groups of market participants,
regulators, and affected communities into the decision-making
process and (ii) engages with creative solutions to regulatory
problems.24 While this literature has been around for a few decades,
Professor Johnson’s (re)turn to it is well-timed, as others too are
pondering how broadly a company’s constituents should be
conceived, so as to minimize externalities and inequality.25
Pushing the boundaries of compliance even further, Claire Sylvia
and Emily Stabile argue in Rethinking Compliance: The Role of
Whistleblowers that whistleblowers can enhance internal compliance
programs. Sylvia and Stabile, from the prominent whistleblower law
firm of Phillips and Cohen LLP, delve into the controversy over
share information without, at minimum, a legal promise to protect it.” Id. at __.
19. Id. at __.
20. Most notably, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
21. That is, a decision to go beyond the strictures of existing law can reverberate to other
compliance cultures.
22. See Johnson, supra note __, at __.
23. Id. at __.
24. See id. at __. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note __; IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). See also Johnson,
supra note __, at __ (“Fundamentally, New Governance counterbalances the weaknesses of selfregulation by emphasizing regulated entities’ accountability to the broader communities where they
operate.”).
25. See, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW (2015);
David Millon, Team Production Theory: A Critical Appreciation, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 79 (2014);
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247
(1999).
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Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections, which were patterned after
the False Claims Act but do not require a whistleblower to report
internally or initiate a lawsuit on the government’s behalf.26 Of
course, the whistleblower model is hardly a “new” safeguard against
corporate abuses; it has been around long enough to have amassed a
substantial body of cases, as well as government and scholarly
literature devoted to the empirical analysis of its effects.27 This
Essay weaves together numerous examples of where whistleblower
programs not only helped to ferret out wrongdoing in individual
cases, but over the long term bolstered compliance programs and
ethics standards across entire industries.28 Even where, as in DoddFrank, whistleblower rewards seem disconnected from internal
compliance, they can nonetheless buttress ineffective or underutilized
compliance programs.29 Hence, whistleblowers are an important, if
unexpected, corporate constituent that can help attain the goals of
compliance programs: fidelity to the law, preventing abuses, and
cultivating an ethical business culture.
Finally, this issue of the Cincinnati Law Review also includes the
2015 Taft Lecture, given by Professor Gerken and titled Living under
Someone Else’s Law. While the Lecture revolved around vertical
federalism, a constitutional issue, the Lecture has resonances for
compliance.
Specifically, there may be instances in which
differences in compliance regimes between two jurisdictions prove
illuminating. A regime that incorporates whistleblower protections
might work in the U.S., for instance, but it would be untenable in the
EU.30 There may be doctrinal, institutional, and cultural reasons for
the differences.31 If we were to channel the lessons of Professor
Gerken’s lecture,32 then, as each jurisdiction’s compliance culture
26. See Claire Sylvia & Emily Stabile, Rethinking Compliance: The Role of Whistleblowers, 84
U. CIN. L. REV. __, __ (2016); Dodd-Frank, § 922(a).
27. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care
Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 13, 2004),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm; U.S. Securities & Exchange
Comm’n,
Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower
Program,
2015
Rep.
to
Cong.,
http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf.
28. See, e.g., Sylvia & Stabile, supra note __, at __ (discussing changes in defense contracting as
a result of modernizing the False Claims Act).
29. Id. at __.
30. This is due to lingering trauma from Nazi and Communist eras, where informing on one’s
family, neighbors, and associates eroded the social fabric. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., How to Launch
and Operate a Legally-Compliant International Workplace Report Channel, 45 INT’L LAW. 903, 906
(2011); Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Hotlines across Europe: Directions through the Maze, 42 INT’L
LAW. 1, 11-16 (2008).
31. For instance, international harmonization is all the rage in financial regulation, but
harmonization is less extant in data protection and virtually irrelevant in health care regulation.
32. Professor Gerken’s Lecture teaches that spillovers are inevitable in our age of
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evolves in accordance with that jurisdiction’s regulations, we would
hope that the differences will prod companies to think critically about
pushing the parameters of their own compliance programs.
We will have to leave the debate over harmonizing compliance
regimes to the comparativists. For now, this issue is a worthy start
for re-conceptualizing compliance.

interconnectivity, and sometimes spillovers should be celebrated, not least for their capacity to foster
discourse in our politically divided society. See Heather K. Gerken, Living under Someone Else’s Law,
84 U. CIN. L. REV. __, __ (2016).

